The philosophy of memory today and tomorrow: Editors' introduction by Michaelian, Kourken et al.
 The Philosophy of Memory Today and 
Tomorrow: Editors’ Introduction Kourken Michaelian et al. Editors’ Introduction
 Kourken  Michaelian ,  Dorothea  Debus, and 
 Denis  Perrin 
 1 The Philosophy of Memory Today 
 As Bernecker and Michaelian point out in their introduction to the recent 
Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory ( 2017 ), it is hardly 
surprising, given that memory is one of our most fundamental cognitive 
capacities and the source of an enormous fraction of our knowledge, that 
philosophical interest in memory dates back to the dawn of philosophy 
and has remained strong throughout the history of the discipline. What 
is surprising is the fact that the philosophy of memory has only recently 
emerged as a recognized fi eld of research. Whatever the explanation for the 
delayed emergence of the fi eld, it now most defi nitely has emerged, with 
the publication of the  Handbook being only the most obvious sign of this 
development. Other signs include the rapid proliferation of workshops, 
conferences, and special issues on the topic of memory and the establishment, 
at the Issues in Philosophy of Memory conference held in Cologne in 2017, 
of the PHilosophy Of Memory Organization (phomo.org). There is, in short, 
a lot going on in the philosophy of memory today, and, whereas the entries 
for the  Handbook were compiled so as to provide a systematic overview of 
historical and contemporary philosophical research on memory, the present 
volume,  New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory , offers a snapshot of 
some of the most active and dynamic areas of current research. 
 2 Overview of the Book 
 The book has seventeen chapters (not including this introduction). The 
chapters are grouped into six parts, of which we here provide brief overviews. 
 2.1 Part I: Challenges and Alternatives to the Causal Theory of Memory 
 Though the causal theory, which was given its classical formulation by 
 Martin and Deutscher (1966 ), has for long been the dominant philosophical 
theory of remembering (see, e.g.,  Bernecker, 2010 ;  Cheng & Werning, 
2016 ), it has in recent years come under increasing pressure, and the 
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three contributions to  Part I consider challenges and alternatives to the 
theory. According to the classical causal theory, the occurrence of genuine 
remembering presupposes the existence of a certain sort of causal connection 
between the subject’s apparent memory and his earlier experience of the 
remembered event, namely, a causal connection sustained by a memory trace 
originating in that experience. As  Michaelian and Robins demonstrate in 
their chapter, increasing recognition among philosophers of the thoroughly 
reconstructive character of remembering (e.g.,  Robins, forthcoming ; 
 Salvaggio, forthcoming ) has led to the formulation not only of versions of 
the causal theory that attempt to do without memory traces but also of 
postcausal theories that reject the necessity of causal connection for genuine 
remembering outright. Inspired both by  Sutton’s (1998 ) philosophical work 
on distributed memory storage and attributionalist approaches to memory 
in psychology ( Whittlesea, 1997 ),  Perrin develops a theory of the former 
sort. According to his procedural causal theory, the causal connection 
characteristic of remembering obtains not between the retrieved memory 
and the earlier experience but rather between the reconstructive process 
that produces the memory and the constructive process that produced the 
experience. Though quite far from the theory defended by Martin and 
Deutscher, Perrin’s theory is recognizably a causal theory. The functionalist 
theory developed by  Fernández , in contrast, joins postcausal theories 
such as the simulation theory ( Michaelian, 2016 ; cf.  De Brigard, 2014 ) 
in advocating the outright rejection of the necessity of causal connection 
for remembering. Applying general functionalist approaches developed 
in philosophy of mind, Fernández argues that a memory state should be 
understood as a state of a sort that tends to be caused by the corresponding 
earlier experience but that it need not in fact be caused by that experience. 
 2.2 Part II: Activity and Passivity in Remembering 
 Both Perrin’s argument for the procedural causal theory and Fernández’s 
argument for the functionalist theory are informed by a conception of 
remembering as an active, reconstructive process. The three chapters 
that make up  Part II share this conception, but rather than proposing 
general theories of reconstructive remembering, they focus specifi cally 
on its active dimension. Building on recent work on feeling-based 
metacognition (see, e.g.,  Proust, 2013 ;  Dokic, 2014 ),  Arango-Muñoz and 
Bermúdez argue that, far from being a matter of the passive storage and 
retrieval of information, remembering is a matter of reconstructing the 
past and that this reconstruction qualifi es, in virtue of the role played in 
it by metacognitive feelings, as a form of full-fl edged mental action. Like 
Arango-Muñoz and Bermúdez,  Hutto and Peeters abandon the passive, 
storage-and-retrieval picture of remembering for a picture of remembering 
as the active reconstruction of the past. Building on a range of empirical 
research, including research on episodic memory as a form of mental time 
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travel ( Perrin & Michaelian, 2017 ), they argue that radical enactivism (e.g., 
 Hutto & Myin, 2013 ,  2017 ) grounds a view of remembering, including 
experientially rich forms of episodic remembering, that dispenses entirely 
with the notion of stored content. There are potential links here both with 
the procedural causal theory defended by Perrin in his chapter, which 
likewise rejects the claim that remembering involves stored content, and 
with the relationalist account of memory defended elsewhere by  Debus 
(2008 ), which rejects the view that retrieved memories have representational 
content.  Debus ’ contribution to this volume may nevertheless be at odds 
with those of Hutto and Peeters and of Arango-Muñoz and Bermúdez, as it 
stresses that episodic or recollective memories have characteristic features of 
both activity and passivity. Adopting an epistemological perspective, Debus 
argues that memory is able to serve as a source and ground of knowledge 
because, when the subject remembers, the past impinges on him as a passive 
recipient. There may be less incompatibility with more reconstructive views 
here than one might initially think, however, as Debus also argues that the 
relevant type of passivity is compatible with at least some active intervention 
by the subject, such as that involved in switching from fi eld to observer 
perspective (see  McCarroll, forthcoming ). 
 2.3 Part III: The Affective Dimension of Memory 
 Like a majority of the contributors to P art II ,  Gerrans understands memory 
as a form of mental time travel into the past, performed by the same 
neural systems responsible for mental time travel into the future. Whereas 
the contributions to  Part II are concerned with the active dimension of 
remembering, understood as past-oriented mental time travel, Gerrans’ 
contribution to  Part III is concerned with another specifi c dimension of past- 
and future-oriented mental time travel, namely, its affective dimension. 
Mental time travel, he argues, in line with  Goldie’s (2012 ) narrative account 
and with accounts stressing the sense of ownership involved in memory 
( Fernández, forthcoming ), can be understood as involving empathy for 
one’s past or future selves. Focusing on the case of painful memories, he 
argues that, when one remembers, one can in a very literal sense share 
feelings with one’s past self. One does this not, he claims, by simulating 
one’s past experience in full, including one’s past feeling of pain, but 
rather by simulating the feeling of being the person undergoing the pain. 
Arcangeli and Dokic are similarly concerned with the affective dimension of 
remembering, understood as past-oriented mental time travel. On one view 
of the relationship between memory and emotion, a memory can be about 
a past emotion. On another view, a memory can cause a present emotion. 
But on neither view can a memory itself have an emotional component. 
Arcangeli and Dokic, drawing, like Gerrans, on Goldie’s account, argue for 
a novel view of the relationship between memory and emotion, suggesting 
that we must acknowledge, in addition to the perspective of the remembered 
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subject and the perspective of the remembering subject, the perspective 
of the narrator of the remembered event and that doing so enables us to 
acknowledge the possibility of memories with a genuinely emotional 
component, the idea being that genuinely affective memories occur as 
the narrator’s emotional perspective directly infl uences the remembering 
subject’s emotional perspective. 
 2.4 Part IV: Memory in Groups 
 The affective dimension of remembering is also at issue in  Sutton ’s chapter, 
but whereas the contributions to  Part III largely bracket the social dimension 
of remembering, Sutton seeks to bring these two dimensions together in a 
treatment of memory at the group level. Picking up on recent approaches to 
remembering as a collective process ( Michaelian & Sutton, 2017 ) and recent 
arguments for the possibility of distributed affectivity ( Krueger & Szanto, 
2016 ), he argues that both remembering and feeling are sometimes socially 
shared, rather than internal or strictly individual, activities. In line with 
his previous argument for a complementarity-based approach to extended 
cognition ( Sutton, 2010 ), however, he maintains that complementary 
relations between subjects in different affective states are often more 
important for the occurrence of collective remembering than is convergence 
among individuals in the same affective state.  De Brigard ’s chapter likewise 
concerns the social or collective dimension of remembering, but whereas 
Sutton’s focus is on affect, De Brigard’s focus is on the abilities necessary 
for participation in joint reminiscing. He draws on earlier suggestions by 
Hoerl and McCormack (2004) and  Campbell (2002 ) to explore the abilities 
on which this form of collective remembering depends, identifying three 
such abilities. Mental ostension consists in inward attention to a specifi c 
component of a memorial content. Deferred mental ostension is a matter 
of indirect attention through deference to a present mental content. Finally, 
concerted deferred mental ostension is the ability to guide someone else’s 
attention inwardly toward the relevant aspect of the mental content. 
 2.5 Part V: Memory Failure: Concepts and Ethical Implications 
 Many of the chapters in the preceding parts of the book seek to understand 
how memory works when it does work; the chapters in  Part V , in contrast, 
seek to understand how memory works when it fails.  Frise ’s chapter takes 
up a topic that has so far been neglected in the philosophy of memory 
despite its obvious importance to the fi eld, that of the nature of forgetting. 
Reviewing a range of discussions of forgetting in the philosophical and 
psychological literatures on memory, Frise considers and rejects the theories 
of the nature of forgetting implicit in these discussions on the ground that 
they fail two tests: they do not accommodate the existence of the feeling 
of forgetting (see  Arango-Muñoz, 2013 ), and they do not accommodate 
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the fact that some failures of prospective memory (see  Szpunar, Spreng, & 
Schacter, 2016 ) qualify as instances of forgetting. He therefore introduces a 
new theory, the LEarning, Access failure, Dispositional (LEAD) theory, and 
argues that it passes these tests.  Bernecker ’s chapter is likewise concerned 
with forgetting, focusing not on its nature but rather on its ethics. Many 
have claimed that one cannot be held responsible for forgetting because 
it is not under one’s control. Some (e.g.,  Matheson, 2017 ) have argued 
that forgetting is sometimes under one’s control and that, when it is, one 
can be held responsible for it. Bernecker concurs but goes further, arguing 
that one can also sometimes be held responsible for forgetting even when 
it is not under one’s control.  Craver and Rosenbaum ’s chapter likewise has 
an ethical focus, but they are concerned with the ethical implications of a 
much more dramatic sort of memory failure, that manifested in cases of 
episodic amnesia. Writing from the point of view of researchers working 
with amnesic subjects, they interrogate the ability of such subjects to give 
meaningful consent to participate in experiments. While it might be thought 
that episodic amnesiacs are trapped in a “permanent present tense” ( Corkin, 
2013 ), they discuss evidence that amnesiacs are likely to have the capacities 
necessary for meaningful consent (e.g.,  Craver et al., 2014 ) and argue that 
a subject need not be able to recall the moment of consent in order for his 
consent to endure. 
 2.6  Part VI: The Content and Phenomenology of Episodic and 
Semantic Memory 
 The chapters making up the fi nal part of the book are all concerned, in 
one way or another, with the content and phenomenology of episodic and 
semantic memory.  Rowlands , in his chapter, sets out the idea, developed in 
his own recent work ( Rowlands, 2017 ) and in that of others ( Fernández, 
2008 ), that the content of a retrieved episodic memory must be understood 
as referring not only to the remembered episode but also to the location 
of the remembered episode in the subject’s personal past, suggesting that 
the latter aspect of episodic memory content can be described using the 
Fregean notion of a mode of presentation. He argues further that this 
implies that the content of an episodic memory is not independent of the 
act of remembering and that this entails that remembering is reconstructive 
in character.  Soteriou similarly suggests that episodic remembering involves 
not only a representation of a past episode but also a representation of a 
temporal perspective on that episode. In opposition to recent arguments 
that have sought to undermine the distinction between remembering the 
past and imagining it ( Michaelian, 2016 ), he argues that the distinction is 
underwritten by the different ways in which the temporal location of the 
represented event is determined: by the actual temporal location of the past 
event, in the case of remembering, and by the subject’s intentions, in the 
case of imagining (cf.  Hoerl, 2014 ). Whereas Soteriou is concerned with 
15032-1019d-1pass-r02.indd   5 08-02-2018   23:19:05
6 Kourken Michaelian et al. 
the distinction between episodic memory and episodic imagination,  Hoerl , 
in his chapter, is concerned with the distinction between episodic memory 
and semantic memory. The question of the distinguishing mark of episodic 
memory—of the nature of episodicity ( Perrin & Rousset, 2014 )—is familiar, 
but Hoerl defends a new answer to the question, arguing that, while both 
episodic memory and semantic memory display an epistemic asymmetry 
between past and future, they do so in different ways, with episodic 
memory providing the subject with knowledge not only of past events but 
also of what it was like to experience them.  Teroni , fi nally, is concerned 
with semantic rather than episodic memory, suggesting that, while the 
attitude of semantic remembering can be explained in terms of the feeling of 
familiarity, the feeling of familiarity does not itself justify semantic memory 
belief. Instead, he argues, it is the subject’s past reasons for the belief, rather 
than the associated feeling of familiarity, that justifi es a current semantic 
memory belief. 
 3 The Philosophy of Memory Tomorrow 
 Our intention, in putting this book together, was for it to provide a snapshot 
of current research directions in the philosophy of memory. What, then, 
does the snapshot reveal? Our overview of the book’s contents suggests four 
key observations. 
 3.1 Methodological Consensus 
 First, there is now a stable consensus on the relevance of empirical research 
in psychology and other disciplines to the resolution of philosophical debates 
about memory. There remain, to be sure, differences of degree between those 
philosophers of memory who proceed in a more a priori manner and those 
who rely more heavily on empirical research. But virtually every chapter in 
the book is informed to some extent by empirical research, suggesting that 
the difference between relevant underlying methodological assumptions is 
much less stark than it was only a few years ago. 
 3.2 Substantive Consensus 
 Second, there is now a stable consensus on the active, reconstructive 
character of remembering. Whereas philosophers of memory until recently 
treated this as something to be defended (or attacked) by means of argument, 
the claim that memory has a reconstructive character now most often serves 
as a starting point for further argument. The psychology of memory is 
univocal in its endorsement of a reconstructive view, and this substantive 
consensus is no doubt in part a product of the methodological consensus 
noted previously. The consensus is on display throughout the book, but see 
especially the chapters in  Part II . 
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 3.3 New Questions About Memory 
 Third, as consensus emerges on certain basic features of memory, 
philosophers of memory are asking new questions. These include more fi ne-
grained questions about previously neglected aspects of individual memory, 
such as the role of affect discussed in  Part III . They include questions about 
previously neglected mnemic phenomena such as the sorts of memory failure 
discussed in  Part V . And they include questions about remembering beyond 
the individual level, such as the forms of group memory discussed in  Part IV . 
 3.4 Back to Basics 
 Finally, even as they ask new questions, philosophers of memory are 
displaying a new willingness to tackle afresh what is perhaps the most basic 
question of the philosophy of memory, that of the nature of remembering 
as such, by proposing radically new theories of remembering. As the 
contributions to  Part I demonstrate, increasing methodological reliance 
on empirical results has suggested new ways of understanding the nature 
of remembering; these challenge the long-dominant causal theory without 
reverting to older epistemic or empiricist theories of memory. Along the 
same lines, the contributions to  Part VI illustrate continuing attempts to 
solve the diffi cult puzzles posed by the relationship between episodic 
memory and episodic imagination and that between episodic memory and 
semantic memory. 
 Overall, this combination of methodological consensus and consensus 
on the broad contours of the phenomenon under investigation, on the one 
hand, with, on the other hand, active debate over specifi c features of the 
phenomenon and rival general theoretical characterizations of it suggests 
a fi eld in good health. The state of the philosophy of memory today thus 
suggests a bright tomorrow for the fi eld. 
Acknowledgments: The initial idea for this book emerged through 
conversation among the editors at a conference in Grenoble in 2015. Many 
of the chapters were presented in preliminary form at two subsequent 
meetings, Memory and Subjectivity, held in Grenoble in mid-2016 and 
funded by a grant to Denis Perrin from the Institut Universitaire de France, 
and New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory, held in Dunedin in late 
2016 and funded by a grant to Kourken Michaelian from the University of 
Otago. In addition to the funders, the editors wish to thank the contributors, 
all of whom delivered excellent chapters on time despite having to respect 
a tight deadline, as well as those colleagues (some themselves contributors 
and some not) who served as reviewers for the chapters. 
 References 
 Arango-Muñoz, S. (2013). Scaffolded memory and metacognitive feelings.  Review 
of Philosophy and Psychology ,  4 (1), 135–152. 
15032-1019d-1pass-r02.indd   7 08-02-2018   23:19:05
8 Kourken Michaelian et al. 
 Bernecker, S. (2010).  Memory: A philosophical study . Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 Bernecker, S., & Michaelian, K. (Eds.). (2017).  The Routledge handbook of 
philosophy of memory . London: Routledge. 
 Campbell, J. (2002).  Consciousness and reference . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 Cheng, S., & Werning, M. (2016). What is episodic memory if it is a natural kind? 
Synthese ,  193 (5), 1345–1385. 
 Corkin, S. (2013).  Permanent present tense: The unforgettable life of the amnesic 
patient ,  HM . New York: Basic Books. 
 Craver, C. F., Kwan, D., Steindam, D., & Rosenbaum, R. S. (2014). Individuals with 
episodic amnesia are not stuck in time.  Neuropsychologia ,  57 , 191–195. 
 De Brigard, F. (2014). Is memory for remembering? Recollection as a form of 
episodic hypothetical thinking.  Synthese ,  191 (2), 155–185. 
 Debus, D. (2008). Experiencing the past: A relational account of recollective 
memory.  dialectica ,  62 (4), 405–432. 
 Dokic, J. (2014). Feeling the past: A two-tiered account of episodic memory.  Review 
of Philosophy and Psychology ,  5 (3), 413–426. 
 Fernández, J. (2008). Memory and time.  Philosophical Studies ,  141 (3), 333–356. 
 Fernández, J. (Forthcoming). The ownership of memories. In M. García-Carpintero & 
M. Guillot (Eds.),  The sense of mineness . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 Goldie, P. (2012).  The mess inside: Narrative, emotion, and the mind . Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 Hoerl, C. (2014). Remembering events and remembering looks.  Review of 
Philosophy and Psychology ,  5 (3), 351–372. 
 Hoerl, C., & McCormack, T. (2004). Joint reminiscing as joint attention to the 
past. In N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack, & J. Roessler (Eds.),  Joint attention: 
Communication and other minds (pp. 260–286). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2013).  Radicalizing enactivism: Basic minds without 
content . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 Hutto, D. D., & Myin, E. (2017).  Evolving enactivism: Basic minds meet content . 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 Krueger, J., & Szanto, T. (2016). Extended emotions.  Philosophy Compass ,  11 (12), 
863–878. 
 Martin, C. B., & Deutscher, M. (1966). Remembering.  The Philosophical Review , 
75 (2), 161–196. 
 Matheson, D. (2017). An obligation to forget. In S. Bernecker & K. Michaelian 
(Eds.),  The Routledge handbook of philosophy of memory (pp. 364–372). 
London: Routledge. 
 McCarroll, C. (Forthcoming).  Remembering from the outside: Personal memory 
and the perspectival mind . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 Michaelian, K. (2016).  Mental time travel: Episodic memory and our knowledge of 
the personal past . Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 Michaelian, K., & Sutton, J. (2017). Collective memory. In M. Jankovic & K. 
Ludwig (Eds.),  The Routledge handbook of collective intentionality (pp. 140–
151). London: Routledge. 
 Perrin, D., & Michaelian, K. (2017). Memory as mental time travel. In S. 
Bernecker & K. Michaelian (Eds.),  The Routledge handbook of philosophy of 
memory (pp. 228–239). London: Routledge. 
15032-1019d-1pass-r02.indd   8 08-02-2018   23:19:05
Editors’ Introduction 9
 Perrin, D., & Rousset, S. (2014). The episodicity of memory.  Review of Philosophy 
and Psychology ,  5 (3), 291–312. 
 Proust, J. (2013).  The philosophy of metacognition: Mental agency and self-
awareness . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 Robins, S. K. (Forthcoming). Confabulation and constructive memory.  Synthese . 
 Rowlands, M. (2017).  Memory and the self: Phenomenology, science, and 
autobiography . Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 Salvaggio, M. (Forthcoming). The justifi cation of reconstructive and reproductive 
memory beliefs.  Philosophical Studies . 
 Sutton, J. (1998).  Philosophy and memory traces: Descartes to connectionism . 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 Sutton, J. (2010). Exograms and interdisciplinarity: History, the extended mind, 
and the civilizing process. In R. Menary (Ed.),  The extended mind (pp. 189–225). 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 Szpunar, K. K., Spreng, R. N., & Schacter, D. L. (2016). Toward a taxonomy of 
future thinking. In K. Michaelian, S. B. Klein, & K. K. Szpunar (Eds.),  Seeing the 
future: Theoretical perspectives on future-oriented mental time travel (pp. 21–35). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 Whittlesea, B. (1997). Production, evaluation, and preservation of experiences: 
Constructive processing in remembering and performance tasks. In D. L. Medin 
(Ed.),  The psychology of learning and motivation: Advances in research and 
theory (Vol. 37, pp. 211–264). Cambridge, MA: Academic Press. 
15032-1019d-1pass-r02.indd   9 08-02-2018   23:19:06
15032-1019d-1pass-r02.indd   10 08-02-2018   23:19:06
